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Assessment reports>Staking>Threat Model>stakeGs
GeneralOverview
Findings
High (1)
Medium (1)
Informational (2)
DiscussionDeployment failure could waste gasTesting coverage assessment
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?BonusDistributor.solRewardDistributor.solRewardTracker.solStakingAdmin.sol
StakingRouter.solclaimclaimPoolcompoundcompoundForAccountstakeEsGsstakeEsGsbstakeGsstakeGsForAccountstakeLoanstakeLoanForAccountstakeLpstakeLpForAccountunstakeEsGsunstakeEsGsbunstakeGsunstakeLoanunstakeLoanForAccountunstakeLpunstakeLpForAccountvestEsGsvestEsGsForPoolvestEsGsbwithdrawEsGswithdrawEsGsForPoolwithdrawEsGsb
Vester.solVesterNoReserve.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: stakeGs(uint256 _amount)

Allows msg.sender to stake gs on behalf of msg.sender.

Inputs

  • _amount

    • Control: Fully controlled by the handler.

    • Constraints: None.

    • Impact: Amount to be staked.

Branches and code coverage (including function calls)

Intended branches

  • Allows msg.sender to stake gs.

  • Calls IRewardTracker.stakeForAccount with gs tracker.

  • Calls IRewardTracker.stakeForAccount with bonus tracker.

  • Calls IRewardTracker.stakeForAccount with fee tracker.

  • Assumes all other relevant checks are performed in IRewardTracker.stakeForAccount.

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