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Assessment reports>Cove>Threat Model>deposit
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (2)
High (3)
Medium (2)
Low (1)
Informational (1)
DiscussionTransparent intent of redeemal might lead to unintended consequencesShares can round down to zeroWeights can pass uncheckedDenial-of-service risk where attackers can disrupt rebalance process with BasketManagerUtils.completeRebalance() functionality
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?AnchoredOracle.solAssetRegistry.solBasketManagerUtils.sol
BasketToken.solcancelDepositRequestcancelRedeemRequestclaimFallbackSharesclaimFallbackSharesdepositdepositfallbackRedeemTriggerfulfillDepositfulfillRedeemmintmintprepareForRebalanceproRataRedeemredeemrequestDepositrequestRedeemsetBitFlagsetOperatorwithdraw
CoWSwapAdapter.solCoWSwapClone.solFeeCollector.solManagedWeightStrategy.sol
Audit ResultsAssessment Results

Function: deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver)

This function wraps the deposit function to allow the caller to deposit assets without specifying a controller.

Inputs

  • assets

    • Control: Fully controlled by the caller.

    • Constraints: None at this level.

    • Impact: The amount of assets to be claimed.

  • receiver

    • Control: Fully controlled by the caller.

    • Constraints: None at this level.

    • Impact: The address to receive the shares.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • Call deposit with assets, receiver, and msg.sender as arguments.

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