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Assessment reports>Cove>Threat Model>claimFallbackShares
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (2)
High (3)
Medium (2)
Low (1)
Informational (1)
DiscussionTransparent intent of redeemal might lead to unintended consequencesShares can round down to zeroWeights can pass uncheckedDenial-of-service risk where attackers can disrupt rebalance process with BasketManagerUtils.completeRebalance() functionality
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?AnchoredOracle.solAssetRegistry.solBasketManagerUtils.sol
BasketToken.solcancelDepositRequestcancelRedeemRequestclaimFallbackSharesclaimFallbackSharesdepositdepositfallbackRedeemTriggerfulfillDepositfulfillRedeemmintmintprepareForRebalanceproRataRedeemredeemrequestDepositrequestRedeemsetBitFlagsetOperatorwithdraw
CoWSwapAdapter.solCoWSwapClone.solFeeCollector.solManagedWeightStrategy.sol
Audit ResultsAssessment Results

Function: claimFallbackShares()

This function wraps the claimFallbackShares function to allow the caller to claim their own fallback shares.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • Call claimFallbackShares with msg.sender as both receiver and controller.

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