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Assessment reports>Singularity>Low findings>Pool parameters are not verified in Curve multiexchange
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (7)
High (2)
Medium (4)
Low (6)Relayers can drain Curve asset managersTransfer and approval done by `_transferERC20`Low-entropy note generationPool parameters are not verifiedSignatures in circuits are not domain separatedIncomplete asset-validation logic
Informational (5)
DiscussionSome specifications are inaccurateMiMC hash-length extension attackBN254 security levelReturn value of `uniswapLiquidityProvision`Assumption on non-fungible position identifiersRemoved Uniswap positions are keptGas saving in MerkleTreeOperatorGas savings and specification of Mimc254Confusing argument orderCentralization risks
Audit ResultsSummary
Category: Coding Mistakes

Pool parameters are not verified in Curve multiexchange

Low Impact
Low Severity
Medium Likelihood

Description

In the function curveMultiExchange, the route and the swap parameters are verified within the route-hash computation and included in the proof verification. The pool argument defines the pool addresses, and the array is passed as an argument in _args.pools. This argument is not verified in the proof. This argument can be front-run and changed.

Impact

The pool address needs to be a valid pool address for the given token, but nevertheless, it may be changed for another pool the user did not choose. There is not a big margin for exploitation.

Recommendations

It can be added to the route-hash computation to enforce its verification.

Remediation

This issue has been acknowledged by Singularity, and a fix was implemented in commit 1c9f23e1↗.

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