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Assessment reports>Origami Finance>Threat Model>shutdownBorrower
GeneralOverview
Findings
Low (3)
DiscussionPossible share-price inflationLack of validationExemplary codebasePotential price arbitrage
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?LinearWithKinkInterestRateModel.solMintableToken.solOrigamiAaveV3IdleStrategy.solOrigamiAbstractLovTokenManager.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerAllUsersPerPeriod.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerProxy.solOrigamiCrossRateOracle.solOrigamiDebtToken.solOrigamiElevatedAccessBase.solOrigamiIdleStrategyManager.solOrigamiInvestmentVault.sol
OrigamiLendingClerk.soladdBorrowerborrowborrowMaxdepositrecoverTokenrepaysetBorrowerDebtCeilingsetBorrowerInterestRateModelsetBorrowerPausedsetGlobalPausedshutdownBorrowerwithdraw
OrigamiLendingRewardsMinter.solOrigamiLendingSupplyManager.solOrigamiLovToken.solOrigamiLovTokenErc4626Manager.solOrigamiOToken.solRepricingToken.solTokenPrices.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: shutdownBorrower(address borrower)

Allows caller with an access to this function to revoke the user's approval for the borrow. The borrower will be deleted from the borrowers array, the current debt (principal + interest) will be reset, and debt tokens will be burned for borrower.

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