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Assessment reports>Origami Finance>Threat Model>borrowMax
GeneralOverview
Findings
Low (3)
DiscussionPossible share-price inflationLack of validationExemplary codebasePotential price arbitrage
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?LinearWithKinkInterestRateModel.solMintableToken.solOrigamiAaveV3IdleStrategy.solOrigamiAbstractLovTokenManager.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerAllUsersPerPeriod.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerProxy.solOrigamiCrossRateOracle.solOrigamiDebtToken.solOrigamiElevatedAccessBase.solOrigamiIdleStrategyManager.solOrigamiInvestmentVault.sol
OrigamiLendingClerk.soladdBorrowerborrowborrowMaxdepositrecoverTokenrepaysetBorrowerDebtCeilingsetBorrowerInterestRateModelsetBorrowerPausedsetGlobalPausedshutdownBorrowerwithdraw
OrigamiLendingRewardsMinter.solOrigamiLendingSupplyManager.solOrigamiLovToken.solOrigamiLovTokenErc4626Manager.solOrigamiOToken.solRepricingToken.solTokenPrices.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: borrowMax(address recipient)

The same as the borrow function, but _borrow is called with the full available amount that can be borrowed.

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