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Assessment reports>Orderly Network>Threat Model>setLastMarkPriceUpdated
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (1)
High (3)
Medium (4)
Informational (1)
DiscussionAdditional checksOverall issues with some functionsThe `changeFeeCollector` does not revertThe `tokenHash` is not a hash from `tokenAddress`
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?AccountTypeHelper.solAccountTypePositionHelper.solCrossChainRelayUpgradeable.solFeeManager.solLedger.solLedgerComponent.solLedgerCrossChainManagerUpgradeable.sol
MarketManager.solsetLastFundingUpdatedsetLastMarkPriceUpdatedsetPerpMarketCfgupdateMarketUploadupdateMarketUpload
OperatorManager.solOperatorManagerComponent.solSignature.solVault.solVaultCrossChainManagerUpgradeable.solVaultManager.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: setLastMarkPriceUpdated(byte[32] _pairSymbol, uint64 _lastMarkPriceUpdated)

This allows the owner of the contract to update the field lastMarkPriceUpdated of the perpMarketCfg configuration.

Inputs

  • data

    • Control: Full control by Owner.

    • Constraints: No checks.

    • Impact: The set perpMarketCfg configuration is not used in any way — without impact.

Branches and code coverage

Negative behavior

  • Caller is not Owner.

  • The new _lastMarkPriceUpdated less than the current.

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