Zellic - Audit Reports

Assessment reports Public findings

Back to Zellic site

Assessment reports>Hyperliquid>Threat Models>emergencyLock

GeneralOverview

Findings

Informational (4)

DiscussionSignature checks do not require arrays of signers Possible improvements for contract transparency

Threat ModelsWhat are threat models?

Bridge2.sol batchedFinalizeWithdrawals changeBlockDurationMillis changeDisputePeriodSeconds deposit emergencyLock emergencyUnlock finalizeValidatorSetUpdate modifyLocker requestWithdrawal updateValidatorSet

Audit ResultsSummary

Function: `emergencyLock()`

This function can be used to lock the contract.

Branches and code coverage (including function calls)

Intended branches

Ensures the caller is authorized and locks the contract.
Test coverage

Negative behavior

Reverts if the caller is not authorized.
Negative test

Zellic © 2025Back to top ↑