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Assessment reports>Y2K Finance>Discussion>The function `_swapUniswapV2` can be rewritten
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (1)
High (3)
Medium (5)
Low (4)
Informational (1)
DiscussionVariable naming suggestionDocumentation contains additional parameterThe function `_swapUniswapV2` can be rewrittenLayerZero configurationUse Non-blocking pattern instead of blocking pattern in lzReceiveUse reentrancy guards in deposit and withdraw functions
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?ERC4626.solHookAave.solHookAaveFixYield.solQueueContract.solStrategyVault.solSwapRouter.solbridgeController.solcurve.solswapController.soluniswapV2.soluniswapV3.solvaultController.solzapDest.solzapFrom.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

The function _swapUniswapV2 can be rewritten as it only expects one token swap

The _swapUniswapV2 function in uniswapV2Dest is used to swap one token for another using Uniswap V2 pools. The current implementation of this function is almost identical to the _swapUniswapV2 defined in uniswapV2.

While the function in uniswapV2 was designed to swap multiple tokens, the function in uniswapV2Dest is just expected to swap one. Though there are no security concerns here, we suggest to simplify the current implementation of _swapUniswapV2 in uniswapV2Dest to avoid complexity.

This issue has been acknowledged by Y2K Finance, and a fix was implemented in commit 859022b↗.

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