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Assessment reports>RabbitX>Threat Model>pooledDeposit
GeneralOverview
Findings
Low (2)
Informational (1)
DiscussionOwner of the contract cannot be changedCentralization risk
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?Bfx.solBfxDeposit.solBfxVault.sol
PoolDeposit.solindividualDepositpooledDeposit
Rabbit.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: pooledDeposit(Contribution[] contributions)

This function is for depositing the paymentToken to the rabbit with multiple contributors.

Inputs

  • contributions

    • Control: Completely controlled by the caller.

    • Constraints: None.

    • Impact: A set of contributions to treat as the deposited contributions.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • Transfer the paymentToken from msg.sender to the rabbit.

  • Increase the nextDepositId for each contribution.

Negative behavior

  • Revert when the contribution.amount is not bigger than zero.

  • Revert when the totalAmount is not bigger than zero.

  • Revert when the transfer fails.

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