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Assessment reports>Origami Finance>Threat Model>checkpointReserves
GeneralOverview
Findings
Low (3)
DiscussionPossible share-price inflationLack of validationExemplary codebasePotential price arbitrage
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?LinearWithKinkInterestRateModel.solMintableToken.solOrigamiAaveV3IdleStrategy.solOrigamiAbstractLovTokenManager.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerAllUsersPerPeriod.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerProxy.solOrigamiCrossRateOracle.solOrigamiDebtToken.solOrigamiElevatedAccessBase.solOrigamiIdleStrategyManager.solOrigamiInvestmentVault.solOrigamiLendingClerk.solOrigamiLendingRewardsMinter.solOrigamiLendingSupplyManager.solOrigamiLovToken.solOrigamiLovTokenErc4626Manager.solOrigamiOToken.sol
RepricingToken.soladdPendingReservescheckpointReservesrecoverToken
TokenPrices.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: checkpointReserves()

Updates global variables vestedReserves, pendingReserves, and lastVestingCheckpoint after the period of the VestingDuration is fully completed.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • vestedReserves, pendingReserves, and lastVestingCheckpoint are updated properly.

Negative behavior

  • Vesting period is not completed.

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