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Assessment reports>Origami Finance>Threat Model>exitToNative
GeneralOverview
Findings
Low (3)
DiscussionPossible share-price inflationLack of validationExemplary codebasePotential price arbitrage
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?LinearWithKinkInterestRateModel.solMintableToken.solOrigamiAaveV3IdleStrategy.solOrigamiAbstractLovTokenManager.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerAllUsersPerPeriod.solOrigamiCircuitBreakerProxy.solOrigamiCrossRateOracle.solOrigamiDebtToken.solOrigamiElevatedAccessBase.solOrigamiIdleStrategyManager.solOrigamiInvestmentVault.solOrigamiLendingClerk.solOrigamiLendingRewardsMinter.solOrigamiLendingSupplyManager.solOrigamiLovToken.solOrigamiLovTokenErc4626Manager.sol
OrigamiOToken.solamoBurnamoMintexitToNativeexitToTokeninvestWithNativeinvestWithToken
RepricingToken.solTokenPrices.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: exitToNative(ExitQuoteData, address payable)

The function is not supported in this contract. See the OrigamiOTokenWithNative.exitToNative() function.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • The investWithNative function reverts

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