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Assessment reports>Falcon Finance>Threat Model>unstake
GeneralOverview
Findings
Medium (1)
Low (1)
Informational (4)
DiscussionThe initialization of StakedUSDf may failThe vestingPeriod and cooldownDuration can be set to zero simultaneously
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?ClassicMinterV1.solFalconBundler.solFalconPosition.solPreCollateralizedMinter.sol
StakedUSDf.solcooldownAssetscooldownSharesredeemunstakewithdraw
USDfSilo.sol
Audit ResultsAssessment Results

Function: unstake(address receiver)

This function unstakes assets after the cooldown period ends.

Inputs

  • receiver

    • Control: Fully controlled by the caller.

    • Constraints: N/A.

    • Impact: Address to receive the assets.

Branches and code coverage

Intended branches

  • Check that the receiver is not the zero address.

  • Check that the caller's cooldown period has ended.

  • Set caller's cooldown and underlyingAmount to zero.

  • Call silo's withdraw function to withdraw assets with the amount of underlyingAmount.

Negative behavior

  • If the receiver is the zero address, the transaction will be reverted.

  • If the caller's cooldown period has not ended, the transaction will be reverted.

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