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Assessment reports>Lido Fixed Income>Threat Model>finalizeVaultNotStartedFixedWithdrawals
GeneralOverview
Findings
Critical (2)
High (3)
Medium (2)
Low (5)
Informational (2)
DiscussionConsider transferring stETH instead of ETHConfusing math in finalizeVaultEndedWithdrawalsPremium claim requirement ensures safety tooComment implies more centralization than existsUse batch withdrawals for gas savingsUnused event `VaultCodeSet`
Threat ModelWhat are threat models?
LidoVault.solclaimFixedPremiumdepositfinalizeVaultEndedWithdrawalsfinalizeVaultNotStartedFixedWithdrawalsfinalizeVaultOngoingFixedWithdrawalsfinalizeVaultOngoingVariableWithdrawalsgetFixedOngoingWithdrawalRequestIdsgetFixedOngoingWithdrawalRequestTimestampinitializeisEndedisStartedmaxStETHWithdrawalAmountminStETHWithdrawalAmountstakingBalancewithdraw
VaultFactory.sol
Audit ResultsSummary

Function: finalizeVaultNotStartedFixedWithdrawals()

This function is to finalize the fixed withdrawal with requestIds if not started.

Function call analysis

  • this.claimWithdrawals(msg.sender, requestIds) -> this._claimWithdrawals(user, requestIds) -> LidoVault.lidoWithdrawalQueue.claimWithdrawal(requestIds[i])

    • What is controllable? None.

    • If the return value is controllable, how is it used and how can it go wrong? None.

    • What happens if it reverts, reenters or does other unusual control flow? N/A.

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